sions. The futurist who ignores the likely impact of values and value changes will produce a distorted model of the future that may well be worse than no model. The policy analyst who projects alternative futures and then decides among them would do better to present the values involved with each alternative as sympathetically as possible. Otherwise he will, under the guise of "valuefree inquiry," simply project his own hidden values into the analysis. When authors fail to make their value decisions explicit, the reader has the extra task to read-and read critically-what is behind the lines.
will judge all new national histories by the measure of Zeldin's two volumes.
Outside the pale of the official France that politicians and intellectuals have taught us to know there are many French nations. Zeldin, mentor and practitioner of the new serial history, dedicates his work to introducing us to some of these nations he considers the most important and significant.
In Volume I we meet them at length and in intimacy in eminently readable chapters composed of fascinating mosaics of anecdote, data, and comparison.
Among those we meet are the rich, the workers, the peasants (an especially good chapter), the industrialists, the bankers.. the bweaucrats, and the notaries. We understand them in their powers and weaknesses, their functions and ambitions, and even in their secret lives. Zeldin does not mind undoing a myth or two along the way. Of France's "twenty million unchanging French peasants. who for a hundred years have provided France with stability and the power of a democratic republic," he suggests that on all counts-by nature of wealth, land, voting, religious practice, customs, and so on-they form many different groups which, owing to turmoil, rivalry, and sheer confusion, are being pushed and are scrambling their way into the modern world. Regarding Napoleon Ill's successful social policy, Zeldin prefers explanations of successful manipulation of differing interests to theories about the totalitarian nature of mass society. Napoleon's policy succeeded because it meant ''Careers open to talent, fusion of classes, the ending of privileges except those based on merit, prosperity for all but not at the expense of rich, employment and social benefits for the working class, cheap credit and less taxation for the mortgaged peasantry, property ultimatelj for all men, great public works and improved communications which would be self financing because they would increase the national wealth, peace, but also glory. In the second volume we get a closer view of the various French nations which, for the most part, treasured their private lives above public life. Public life was a topic more fit for idle discussion than serious concern. Here we meet people eating and drinking, thinking about themselves and others, trying to look beautiful, have a good time and not fall prey to envy; people lying, feeling guilty, getting old, not wanting to die, dying anyhow. Suggestive of the contents of the volume are chapter titles such as "Education and Hope," "Privilege and Culture," "Good and Bad Taste,'' "Conformity and Superstition," "Happiness and Humor," "Worry, Boredom and Hysteria," "Gerontocracy," and " 
, France's most famous contemporary philosopher. While France's intellectuals and artists hungrily bid for universal fame, the majority pursued its pleasure almost anywhere else than in the complex. depressing, and narcissistic creations of the nation's cultural 6lite. Zeldin used this striking illustration: "AS great French actress Sarah Bernhardt labored before the Great War to make 8000 francs on a good Sunday at the Parisian box office, Joseph Pujol (Le Pktomane), farter extraordinaire, hauled in 20,000 as masses poured in to watch him do such things as insert a hose into his anus and puff a cigarette attached to the end, and then play the flute with it."
The frivolity of the masses did not always hide the deeper fact: "Frenchmen no longer needed to fear death by starvation. But men became more mobile, both physically and socially; the many new opportunities before them complicated the choices they had to make and created tensions as severe as have been experienced before or since." This meant experiencing the anxiety that comes with the desire for a better life, the guilt of having and trying to satisfy new wants, the boredom that invariably comes with first experiences of idle Sundays. In some cases it even meant trying to square one's pleasure and religion, superstitions and science. (Zeldin delightfully calls our attention to the existence of voyantes dipl6mies and mediums agrkis!)
In short, there was deep confusion. It is little wonder "that nostalgia was more wide-spread than optimism" in the presence of so much uncertainty. And there cannot be much suprise in the fact that different parts of these nations zigzagged, turned about, and were twisted in their search for a sustaining sense of order. Two quotations can be used to summarize Zeldin's view of the uncertain position of the individual and the superficiality of the national ideal:
"The individual had not learnt to cope with himself, let alone with the political and economic institutions surrounding him .... The problems of human relations, of dealing with family, friends and strangers, were baffling because human knowledge was still in a very primitive stage. Frenchmen were not short of ideas, nor banners behind which they could march, but they were short of mirrors in which they could see themselves."
And "The nationalism of France was based on a euphoria which gave people the illusion that they had found a purpose .... It undoubtedly made possible the achievement of noble and plausible goals, but it also diverted a great deal of energy into sterile pursuits. French nationalism in this period, though it was progressive and liberal, was still the child of the monarchs of the ancient rkgime; it was obsessed by power and vanity. Its ambitions were constantly disrupted by emotion, because it had only a limited understanding of the individual imagination: it placed its faith in laws and institutions. Individuals learnt to shrug these off, and this, as much as the efforts of the politician, explains why France was, to a certain extent, or sometimes, a free country."
Much the same, one suspects, might be said of the United States. Zeldin's study of France illuminates a more general truth: that human groups are many, and, like the human heart, do not proceed at the same tempo, the appearance of structural unity notwithstanding. 
Theodore Michael Kerrine
The state of public education seems to be on everyone's mind these days. Almost daily we are reminded of the alarming rate of decline of test scores across the nation. States are falling over one another in a rush to establish minimal competency standards. Congress is caught up in debate over the relative merits of a number of proposals designed to provide fiscal relief to the parents of students. Meanwhile, education costs continue to soar, and literacy, especially in the inner cities, remains locked in a nosedive.
For some time there have been two main schools of thought on how to remedy this unhappy state of affairs. One would increase present funding of local school systems in the hope that more money will effect a turnaround in results; the other would fund the families of students to allow them to make the choices about education. As its title suggests, Education by Choice: The Case for Family Conrrol by Coons and Sugarman makes the argument for the latter alternative. The book is enriched, not only by their considerable knowledge of this area, but also by their experiences as seasoned litigators who have argued similar questions before high courts. It is almost certain to become a major point of reference in the continuing debate. This is a book about primary education, where the tender age of the "client" demands the involvement of mature judgment-the state, acting
